NO a la desaparición de la FACULTAD DE FILOSOFÍA de la COMPLUTENSE

FRASE DE LA SEMANA

Prof. Dr. Camilo Cela Conde

"Camilo José Arcadio Cela Conde (Madrid, 17 de enero de 1946), II marqués de Iria Flavia, es un escritor español y catedrático de Filosofía del Derecho, Moral y Política en la Universidad de las Islas Baleares.

Es hijo único del "Premio Nobel de Literatura Camilo José Cela Trulock (1916-2002) y de su primera esposa, María del Rosario Conde Picavea (1914-2003), docente de formación."

 

"En su bautismo recibió los nombres de Camilo José Arcadio. Los dos primeros por su padre, y el tercero por su abuelo materno, Arcadio Conde Otegui, Juez de Primera Instancia.
Se licenció en Filosofía en 1975 y obtuvo el doctorado en 1978.
Recibió el Premio Miguel de los Santos Oliver de periodismo en 1975.
Publicó su primera obra, El reto de los halcones, en 1975. Ha publicado colaboraciones en distintas revistas de tirada nacional, y como docente ha desarrollado numerosas investigaciones sobre ética, filosofía de la biología, filosofía política y sociología de la conducta innata. Actualmente, imparte clases en la Universidad de las Islas Baleares, actividad que compagina con la escritura.
Fue decano de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de las Islas Baleares desde enero de 1983 hasta mayo de 1989.
En 1989, un día después de que su padre recibiera el Nobel, publicó Cela, mi padre.
En 2005 fue nombrado pregonero de las fiestas de Aranda de Duero conmemorando el cincuentenario de la publicación del libro de su padre Judíos, moros y cristianos, en el que se dedica un capítulo a este municipio y su comarca.
Cela Conde forma parte del grupo permanente de investigación en "Evolución y Cognición Humana" de la Universidad de las Islas Baleares, que tiene entre sus objetivos principales de investigación la organización y el historial evolutivo que nos hace humanos, que nos distingue de otros primates gracias a determinados rasgos exclusivos de nuestra especie. El grupo publica periódicamente sus trabajos.
Es miembro del comité de redacción de numerosas revistas científicas, miembro de la Asociación Americana para el Avance de la Ciencia, miembro del Center for Academic Research and Teaching in Anthropogeny del Instituto Salk y la Universidad de San Diego.
También es columnista del Diario de Mallorca."

"Líneas de investigación:
Evolución humana / Filosofía de la biología / Sistemática / Procesos cognitivos / Percepción estética / Comportamiento moral.

Publicaciones
ARTÍCULOS Y CAPÍTULOS DE LIBROS:
Cela-Conde, C., & Ayala, F. (2014). Brain keys in the appreciation of beauty: a tale of two worlds. Rendiconti Lincei, 1-8. doi: 10.1007/s12210-014-0299-8
Cattaneo, Z., Lega, C., Albert Flexas, A., Nadal, M., Munar, E., & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2013). The world can look better: enhancing beauty experience with brain stimulation. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. doi: 10.1093/scan/nst165
Cela-Conde, C. J., García-Prieto, J., Ramasco, J. J., Mirasso, C., Bajo, R., Munar, E., . . . Maestú, F. (2013). Dynamics of brain networks in the aesthetic appreciation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 110(Supplement 2), 10454-10461. doi: http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1302855110
Cela-Conde, C. J., Gutiérrez Lombardo, R., Avis, J. C., & Ayala, F. J. (2013). In the light of evolution VII. The human mental machinery. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, Early edition. doi: http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1307207110
Agnati, L. F., Guidolin, D., Cortelli, P., Genedani, S., Cela-Conde, C., & Fuxe, K. (2012). Neuronal correlates to consciousness. The “Hall of Mirrors” metaphor describing consciousness as an epiphenomenon of multiple dynamic mosaics of cortical functional modules. Brain Research, doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2012.01.003.
Cela-Conde, C. J., & Nadal, M. (2012). Taxonomical uses of the species concept in the human lineage. Human Origins Research; Vol 2, No 1 (2012), http://www.humanoriginsresearch.net/index.php/hor/article/view/hor.2012.e2011
Christensen, J. F., Flexas, A., de Miguel, P., Cela-Conde, C. J., & Munar, E. (2012). Roman Catholic beliefs produce characteristic neural responses to moral dilemmas. SCAN, doi:10.1093/scan/nss121.
Munar, E., Nadal, M., Castellanos Nazareth, P., Flexas, A., Maest, F., Mirasso, C., & Cela-Conde Camilo, J. (2012). Aesthetic appreciation: from time-frequency analysis to synchronization. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00185
Munar, E., Nadal, M., Rosselló, J., Flexas, A., Moratti, S., Maestú, F., . . . Cela-Conde, C. J. (2012). Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex Involvement in Initial Negative Aesthetic Impression Formation. PLoS One, 7(6), e38152. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0038152
Nadal, M., Flexas, A., Gálvez, Á., & Cela-Conde, C. (2012). Neuroaesthetics: themes from the past, current issues, and challenges for the future. Rendiconti Lincei, 23(3), 247-258. doi: 10.1007/s12210-012-0185-1
Cela-Conde, C. J., & Rincón Ruiz, C. (2011a). The Darwinian Concept of Species. In J. Martínez Contreras & A. Ponce de León (Eds.), Darwin’s Evolving Legacy (pp. 66-73). Ciudad de México, México: Siglo XXI Editores.
Cela-Conde, C. J., & Rincón Ruiz, C. (2011b). El concepto darwiniano de especie. In J. Martínez Contreras & A. Ponce de León (Eds.), darwin y el evolucionismo contemporáneo (pp. 69-79). Ciudad de México, México: Siglo XXI Editores.
Cela-Conde, C. J., Agnati, L., Huston, J. P., Mora, F., & Nadal, M. (2011). The neural foundations of aesthetic appreciation. Progress in Neurobiology, 94, 39-48.
Forsythe, A., Nadal, M., Sheehy, N., Cela-Conde, C. J., & Sawey, M. (2011). Predicting beauty: Fractal dimension and visual complexity in art. British Journal of Psychology, 102, 49-70.
Rincón Ruiz, C., & Cela Conde, C. (2011). Evolución filogenética del lenguaje. Paper presented at the IV Reunión del Consorcio de Neuropsicología Clínica, Palma de Mallorca, 22-25 de febrero.
Cela Conde, C. J., Flexas, A., & Christensen, J. F. (2010). Los valores humanos y el cerebro. Taula, 42, 149-154.
Cela-Conde, C. J., Burges, L. M., Nadal, M., & Olivera, A. (2010). Altruism and fairness: Unnatural selection? C.R. Biologies, 333, 174-180.
Nadal, M., Flexas, A., & Cela-Conde, C. (2010). La capacidad para la apreciación estética: una evolución en mosaico. In A. Martín Araguz (Ed.), Neuroestética (pp. 15-28). Madrid: Saned.
Nadal, M., Munar, E., Marty, G., & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2010). Visual Complexity and Beauty Appreciation: Explaining the Divergence of Results. Empirical Studies of the Arts, 28, 173-191.
Cela-Conde, C. J., Ayala, F. J., Munar, E., Maestú, F., Nadal, M., Capó, M. A., . . . Marty, G. (2009). Sex-related similarities and differences in the neural correlates of beauty. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 106, 3847-3852.
Cela-Conde, C. J., Fernandez Neto, A., Fernandez, M., Fernandez, M. M., & Burges, L. (2009). Naturaleza y dignidad humana. In M. Casado (Ed.), Sobre la Dignidad y los Principios. Análisis de la Declaración Universal de Bioética y Derechos Humanos de la UNESCO (pp. 113-129). Pamplona: Civitas.
Cela-Conde, C. J., Maestu, F., Mirasso, C., Munar, E., & Nadal, M. (2009). Can fMRI Alone Identify Functional Connectivity in the Brain? Science, e-letter Response , http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/eletters/324/5927/605 – 12259, .
Nadal, M., Barceló-Coblijn, L., Olivera, A., Christensen, J. F., Rincón Ruíz, C., & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2009). Darwin’s Legacy: A comparative approach to the evolution of human derived cognitive traits. Ludus Vitalis, 32, 145-172.
Nadal, M., Capó, M. A., Munar, E., & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2009). La evolución de la apreciación estética. Estudios de Psicología, 30, 3-20.
Nadal, M., Capó, M. A., Munar, E., Marty, G., & Cela Conde, C. J. (2009). Constraining hypotheses on the evolution of art and aesthetic appreciation. In M. Skov & O. Vartanian (Eds.), Neuroaesthetics (pp. 103-129). Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing.
Nadal, M., Capó, M., Peters, A., & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2009). The mosaic evolution of aesthetic preference. In H. Høgh-Olesen, J. Tønnesvang & P. Bertelsen (Eds.), Human Characteristics: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Mind and Kind (pp. Chapter Two). Newscatle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Cela Conde, C. J., Gomila, A., Munar, E., & Nadal, M. (2008). Taking Wittgenstein seriously. Indicators of the evolution of language. In D. M. A. Smith, K. Smith & R. Ferrer i Cancho (Eds.), The evolution of language : proceedings of the 7th International Conference (EVOLANG7) (pp. 407-408). Barcelona: World Scientific.
Nadal, M., Munar, E., Capó, M. A., Rosselló, J., & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2008). Towards a framework for the study of the neural correlates of aesthetic preference. Spatial Vision, 21, 379-396.
Cela Conde, C. J., Capó, M. A., Nadal, M., Gual, J., Fernández, M., & Ramos, C. (2007). De homínido a humano. In L. Feito (Ed.), Nuevas perspectivas científicas y filosóficas sobre el ser humano (pp. 67-92). Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas.
Capó, M., Nadal, & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2006). Moral Consilience. Biological Theory, 1, 133-135.
Cela-Conde, C. J., López Arenillas, C., Nadal, M., Capó, M., Cortés Mascaró, A., & Marty, G. (2006). Creativity and evolution. International Congress Series, 1296, 95-105.
Nadal, M., Amengual-Bunyola, G. A., Ramis, C., Capó, M., & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2006). Recent genetic contributions to the study of language. Ludus Vitalis, 14, 187-204.
Cela Conde, C. J. (2005). Moral y medio ambiente. In J. Martínez Contreras (Ed.), Senderos de la conservación y de la restauración ecológica. Evaluación crítica y ética (pp. 47-67). Méjico: Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, Políticos y Sociales Vicente Lombardo Toledano.
Cela Conde, C. J., Nadal, M., Capó, M. A., Ramis, C., & Fernández, A. (2005). Sobre la evolución de la mente. In J. Sanjuán & C. J. Cela Conde (Eds.), La profecía de Darwin. Del origen de la mente a la Psicopatología (pp. 25-36). Barcelona: Ars Medica.
Cela-Conde, C. J. (2005). Did Evolution Fix Human Values? In J. P. Changeux, W. Singer, A. Damasio & Y. Christen (Eds.), Neurobiology of Human values(pp. 11-15). Berlin: Springer Verlag.
Cela-Conde, C. J., Fernández, A., Nadal, M., Capó, M. A., & Ramis, C. (2005). La evolución de la inteligencia humana: ¿una búsqueda imposible? . In F. Guillén-Salazar (Ed.), Existo, luego pienso. Los primates y la evolución de la inteligencia humana (pp. 253-266). Madrid: Aleles.
Eguíluz, V. M., Zimmermann, M. G., Cela-Conde, C. J., & San Miguel, M. (2005). Cooperation and emergence of role differentiation in the dynamics of social networks. American Journal of Sociology, 110, 977-1008.
Fernández, A., Marty, G., Nadal, M., Capó, M. A., & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2005). Derecho y neurociencia. Ludus Vitalis, 12, 131-138.
Maestú, F., González-Marqués, J., Marty, G., Nadal, M., Cela-Conde, C. J., & Ortiz, T. (2005). La magnetoencefalografía: una nueva herramienta para el estudio de los procesos cognitivos básicos. Psicothema, 17, 459-464.
Cela Conde, C. J., & Ayala, F. J. (2004). El concepto de especie y la paleontología humana. ¿Resuelve la cladística nuestros problemas? Pasajes, 14, 15-21.
Cela-Conde, C. J., & Ayala, F. J. (2004). Evolution of Morality. In F. M. Wuketits & C. Antweiler (Eds.), Handbook of Evolution Vol.1 : The Evolution of Human Societies and Cultures (pp. 171-189). Weinheim (Germany): John Wiley & Sons.
Cela-Conde, C. J., Marty, G., Maestú, F., Ortiz, T., Munar, E., Fernández, A., . . . Quesney, F. (2004). Activation of the prefrontal cortex in the human visual aesthetic perception. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 101, 6321–6325.
Cela-Conde, C. J., & Ayala, F. J. (2003). Genera of the human lineage. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100(13), 7684-7689.
Marty, G., Cela Conde, C. J., Munar, E., Rosselló, J., Roca, M., & Escudero, J. T. (2003). Dimensiones factoriales de la experiencia estética. Psicothema, 14, 478-483.
Cela-Conde, C. J., & Altaba, C. R. (2002). Multiplying genera versus moving species: a new taxonomic proposal for the family Hominidae. South African Journal of Science, 98, 229-232.
Cela-Conde, C. J., Marty, G., Munar, E., Nadal, M., & Burges, L. (2002). The “Style Scheme” grounds artistic experience. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 95, 91-100.
Cela Conde, C. J. (2001). Can a cladogram be falsified? Ludus Vitalis, 15, 97-108.
Cela-Conde, C. J. (2001). Hominid Taxon and the Systematics of Hominoidea. In P. V. Tobias, M. A. Raath, J. Moggi-Cecchi & G. A. Doyle (Eds.), Humanity from African Naissance to Coming Millennia (pp. 271-278). Firenze: Firenze University Press & Witwatersrand University Press.
Schwartz, J. H., Collard, M., & Cela-Conde, C. J. (2001). Systematics of “Humankind”. Evolutionary Anthropology, 10, 1-3.
Cela-Conde, C. J., Aguirre, E., Ayala, F. J., Tobias, P. V., Turbón, D., Aiello, L. C., . . . Wood, B. (2000). Systematics of Humankind. Ludus Vitalis, 13, 127-134.
Cela Conde, C. J. (2000b). La evolución de la conducta social. Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo. Valencia.
Cela Conde, C. J. (2000a). El naturalismo contemporáneo: de Darwin a la sociobiología. In V. Camps (Ed.), Historia de la ética. 3: La ética contemporánea(pp. 606-636). Barcelona: Crítica.
Cela-Conde, C. J. (1999). Choosing between Two Conflicting Scientific Hypotheses: The Orce Dilemma. Human Evolution, 14, 47-61.
Cela-Conde CJ (1999)  Complexity and Transition: From Chemical Evolution to Language . Biology & Philosophy, 14: 117-126
Cela-Conde CJ & Marty G (1998) Noam Chomsky’s Minimalist Program and the Philosophy of Mind. Syntax, 1: 19-36
Cela-Conde, C. J. (1998). The meaning of Hominidae . Human Evolution, 13, 251-264.
Cela-Conde CJ (1998) The problem of hominoid systematics, and some suggestions for solving it. South African Journal of Science, 94: 255-262
Cela-Conde CJ & Marty G (1997)  Mind architecture and brain architecture . Biology & Philosophy, 12: 327-340
Cela Conde CJ (1996) Bipedal/savanna/cladogeny model. Can it still be held? History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 18: 213-224
Marty G & Cela-Conde CJ (1995) Entrevista a Walter J. Freeman. Psicothema, 7: 685-689
Cela-Conde CJ & Marty G (1995) Caos y consciencia. Una introducción al pensamiento de Walter J. Freeman. Psicothema, 7: 679-684
Cela-Conde CJ & Marty G (1995) Percepción y consciencia. Entrevista a John R. Smythies. Psicothema, 7: 691-696
Cela Conde CJ (1994) Funcionalismo mental y teoría neurobiológica de la consciencia. Psicothema, 6: 155-163
Cela-Conde CJ & Marty G (1991) El ciudadano Fodor no existe. Estructura y función en los procesos cognitivos. Psicothema, 3: 231-241
Cela Conde CJ (1986) The Challenge of Evolutionary Ethics. Biology & Philosophy, 1: 29-33
Cela-Conde, C. J. (1989). Altruismo biológico y altruismo moral. Taula, 12, 35-47.
Cela Conde CJ, Marty G, Roca M (1986) Darwin and the Spirit of Man, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 8: 174-177
Cela Conde CJ (1984) Nature and Reason in the Darwinian Theory of Moral Sense. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 6: 3-24.
 

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LIBROS:

Cela Conde, C. J., & Ayala, F. J. (2013). Evolución humana. El camino de nuestra especie. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Cela Conde, C. (2011). El origen de la idea. La Coruña (España): Lepourquoipas?
Cela Conde, C. (2009). Hielos eternos. La Coruña (España): Lepouquoipas?

Nadal, M., Capó, M. A., Munar, E., Marty, G., & Cela Conde, C. J. (2009).  Constraining hypotheses on the evolution of art and aesthetic appreciation. In M. Skov & O. Vartanian (Eds.), Neuroaesthetics (pp. 103-129). Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing.

Cela-Conde, C., & Ayala, F. J. (2007). Human Evolution. Trails from the Past. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Ayala, F.J. & Cela Conde, C.J. (2006) La piedra que se volvió palabra. Madrid (Spain): Alianza Editorial.
Cela-Conde, C. J. (2005). Did Evolution Fix Human Values? In J. P. Changeux, W. Singer, A. Damasio & Y. Christen (Eds.), Neurobiology of Human values(pp. 11-15). Berlin: Springer Verlag.
Cela Conde, C. J., & Ayala, F. J. (2001). Senderos de la evolución humana. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Cela Conde, C. J. (1986) On Genes, Gods and Tyrans. Dordrecht (Netherlands), Reidel.
Cela Conde, C. J. (1979) Capitalismo y campesinado en la isla de Mallorca. Madrid

(Spain), Siglo XXI.

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LIBROS EDITADOS:
Cela Conde, C. J.; Marty, G.; & Chomsky, N. (1998) Una aproximación naturalista a la mente y al lenguaje (ed.). Barcelona (Spain): Alba
Sanjuán, J. & Cela Conde, C. J. (2005) La profecía de Darwin. Barcelona (Spain), Ars XXI.

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TESIS DOCTORALES SUPERVISADAS: 
Title: Racionalidad e irracionalidad en las formas religiosas Ph.D. candidate: Piquer Montoro, J. M. Universitat de les Illes Balears (Spain). Faculty of Filosofía y Letras, 1989.

Title: Tras la mente computacional. Ph.D. candidate: Gomila Benejam, A. Universitat de les Illes Balears (Spain). Faculty of Filosofía y Letras, 1990.

Title: Sobre el libre albedrío Ph.D. candidate: Beltrán Munar, M. Universitat de les Illes Balears (Spain). Faculty of Filosofía y Letras, 1990.

Title: Diferencias cognitivas por razón de género. El caso de la preferencia artística. Ph.D. candidate: Burges Cruz, Lucrecia. Universitat de les Illes Balears (Spain) Faculty of Filosofía y Letras, 2001.

Title: Complexity and aesthetic preference for diverse visual stimuli. Ph.D. candidate: Nadal Roberts, Marcos. Universitat de les Illes Balears (Spain) Faculty of Psychology, 2007.

Title: Naturaleza humana y derecho. Ph. D. candidate: Dos Santos Lobato Fernández, Marly. Universitat de les Illes Balears (Spain), 2010

Title: Interpretación jurídica, toma de decisiones y la neurociencia: el papel de la cognición y la emoción en el razonamiento jurídico. Ph. D. candidate: Dos Santos Lobato Fernández, Manuella Maria. Universitat de les Illes Balears (Spain), 2011

Title: Viejas y nuevas perspectivas en sociología de la religión: el surgimiento del paradigma neurocientífico. Ph. D. candidate: Ramos Aguirre, Carlos. Universitat de les Illes Balears (Spain), 2011

Title: Apreciación de estímulos abstractos y figurativos: datos comportamentales y registros cererals. Ph. D. candidate: Flexas Oliver, Albert. Universitat de les Illes Balears (Spain) Facultat de Psicologia, 2013

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EDITORIAL BOARDS:
Contextos (Centro de Estudios Metodológicos e Interdisciplinares, Universidad de León, Spain)
Biology & Philosophy (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecth, Netherlands)
Evolution & Cognition (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research, Vienna, Austria)
Ludus Vitalis: revista de filosofía de las ciencias de la vida (Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, Políticos y Sociales ’Vicente Lombardo Toledano’, México DF, Mexico)
Nueva Ciencia (Editorial Anthropos, Barcelona, Spain)
Systema Naturae (Università degli Studi di Firenze, Firenze, Italy)
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciencies (Stazione Zoologica di Napoli, Napoli, Italy)
Signos filosóficos (Departamento de Filosofía. Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana de México, México DF, Mexico)
Pasajes. Revista de pensamiento contemporáneo. Universitat de València & Fundación Cañada Blanch (Valencia, Spain)
 

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AWARDS:
Fundación Juan March, Sociology Area. 1975
Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Section of Biology (USA), Elected in November, 1999
Member of the Center for Academic Research and Teaching in Anthropogeny, Salk Institute & University of San Diego. Elected in November, 2008."

 
 
FUENTES:
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camilo_Jos%C3%A9_Cela_Conde
www.evocog.org
Foto:laopnioncoruna.es

LIBRO RECOMENDADO: LOS FILÓSOFOS PRESOCRÁTICOS.

¨Pese a la escasez de los textos que nos han quedado de los presocráticos, sus propuestas siguen siendo una fuente inagotable de sugerencias para el estudio. En este libro se reúnen diversos ensayos que abordan cuestiones centrales del pensamiento de estos pioneros de la filosofía en Grecia (lo que quiere decir la de Filosofía, sin más). Algunas de ellas, como la forma literaria de sus escritos o como sus ideas lingüísticas, no han sido frecuentemente objeto de análisis. Otras, en cambio, son cuestiones debatidas a las que se trata de dar respuestas originales.

Especialmente interesante es la presencia de un texto, el Papiro de Derveni, en el que se desarrolla una nueva cosmogonía, con puntos de contacto con las de otros presocráticos, pero que constituye una síntesis muy singular. Aunque el libro está escrito en forma fácilmente comprensible, porque está pensado para un público amplio, puede contener algunas sugerencias atractivas incluso para los especialistas.

Alberto Bernabé es Catedrático de Filología Griega de la Universidad Complutense. Ha trabajado sobre literatura, religión y filosofía griegas y es autor de libros comoFragmentos presocráticos. De Tales a Demócrito (Madrid 1988, 3ª ed. 2008),Hieros logos. Poesía órfica sobre los dioses, el alma y el más allá, Madrid 2003,Textos órficos y filosofía presocrática. Materiales para una comparación, Madrid 2004, Dioses, héroes y orígenes del mundo, Madrid, Abada, 2008, y, en colaboración con A. Jiménez, Instructions for the Netherworld, The Orphic Gold Tablets, Leiden-Nueva York 2008. Ha coordinado con otros editores los librosOrfeo y la tradición órfica: un reencuentro, Madrid 2008, Orfeo y el orfismo, nuevas perspectivas (Biblioteca virtual Cervantes), Reencarnación. La transmigración de las almas entre oriente y occidente, Madrid 2011, y Dioniso: los Orígenes. Textos e imágenes de Dioniso y lo dionisíaco en la Grecia Antigua, Madrid 2013.¨

edicionesevohe.com

Rebutting Ethos and Pathos in Legal Writing (by MATTHEW SALZWEDEL)

Rebutting Ethos and Pathos in Legal Writing

The next time you read legal writing that defies logic, recall the Greek philosopher Aristotle.

Aristotle said that rhetoric is “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.” The first means of persuasion “depends on the personal character of the speaker [ethos]; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind [pathos]; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself [logos].” (Rhetoric, Book I, ch. 2).

Smart lawyers rely on logos—appeals to logic or reason—in their legal writing because it’s the most persuasive form of rhetoric in legal argument. Indeed, as retired Third Circuit Judge Ruggero Aldisert put it: “Logic is the lifeblood of American law.”

Lawyers also sometimes rely on ethos (appeals to the speaker’s reputation, character, credibility, or authority) and pathos (appeals to the audience’s emotions, motivations, self-interest, or biases). But although they’re perfectly acceptable as rhetorical devices, ethos and pathos are logical fallacies, making them liabilities to persuasive legal writing. Here’s how to spot ethos andpathos in legal writing, and how to rebut them.

Rhetorical Logos

Logos takes two distinct forms: inductive and deductive reasoning. Persuasive legal writing is anchored in deduction or induction. So what do these terms mean?

Inductive Reasoning

Inductive reasoning is the process of setting forth similar examples, and asking the audience to draw a conclusion from those examples. In Logic: An Introduction, Robert Paul Churchill defines an inductive argument as:

one for which it is claimed that the premises, if they are true, increase the probability that the conclusion is true as well. . . . [I]nductive inference is an information-extending process; one starts with a set of particular observations or known facts and infers some conclusions about an entity or an event that has not yet been experienced.

Here’s an example of inductive reasoning:

All the lawyers I know who work at law firms attended law school (major premise).

Paul works as lawyer at a law firm (minor premise).

So Paul probably attended law school (conclusion).

This is an example of inductive reasoning because we cannot conclusively establish that Paul went to law school even if we accept that he works at a law firm. Paul, for example, might have lied to his law firm about going to law school, and the firm didn’t verify his educational background. So based on the major and minor premises, we can only conclude that Paul probablywent to law school.

Deductive Reasoning

Deductive reasoning establishes the audience’s agreement with major and minor premises (including premises that are unstated but nonetheless accepted, which are called enthymemes), and then asks the audience to draw a definitive conclusion. Stated another way, if the audience accepts the major and minor premises as true, it must also accept the conclusion as true.

A famous example of deductive reasoning, which Nena Street repeated here in Use Logic to Win Arguments: A Primer for Lawyers, is the following syllogism:

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

So Socrates must be mortal.

If the audience accepts the truth that all men are mortal, and also accepts the truth that Socrates is a man, the audience must accept the conclusion that Socrates is mortal.

Rebutting arguments based in ethos

Most legal arguments based in ethos are implied.

For example, when an appellate judge retires and joins a private firm, and the firm later employs the retired judge to brief an appeal to his former colleagues, the firm is partly trying to persuade the court that it should decide the case in the firm’s favor because of the retired judge’s established reputation, character, and credibility. Former Minnesota Supreme Court Chief Justice Eric J. Magnuson fits this example on the state level (though his lawyering skills also are beyond repute).

To a lesser degree, a litigant can make an implied ethos-based argument if it hires a seasoned advocate with well-established credibility with the court. Former Solicitor Generals Ted Olsonand Paul Clement are two examples on the national level.

Though arguments based in ethos are, by definition, not grounded in deductive or inductive logic, it’s difficult to rebut them because to do so you have to suggest to the court that it will be influenced by the character or reputation of the lawyers arguing the case. But if you decide to take this risk, writing something like this might do the job, if done delicately:

Although Mr. Clement has successfully argued many cases before this Court, his task here would have been easier if he could have relied on the Court’s long line of cases that support my client’s case.

Rebutting arguments based in pathos

Although arguments based in ethos often are implied, arguments based in pathos usually aren’t subtle. In fact, they might be intentional. Arguments based in pathos commonly take the form ofnon-sequiturs—also known as fallacies of irrelevance. Churchill describes a fallacy of irrelevance as:

[A]n argument in which the premises are irrelevant to the conclusion, the relationship between them being based on attitudes, feelings, or impressions created by the premises rather than on information that offers relevant reasons for believing that the conclusion is true.

Fallacies of irrelevance include:

• Ad hominem (personal attack), which includes abusive and circumstantial ad hominem(Example: “He shouldn’t win because he’s a bad person.”).
• Tu quoque (you’re another) (Example: He shouldn’t win because he did the same thing.”).
• Prejudicing the issue (including poisoning the well) (Example: Nietzsche: “Those who disagree with me when I say that mankind is corrupt prove that they are already corrupted.”).

But two other fallacies of irrelevance are mirror-images of pathos: appeals to emotion (including appeals to fear, pity, or sympathy) and appeals to tradition, or ad verecundiam fallacies.

Appeals to emotion and tradition defined

Churchill says that appeals to emotion can be subcategorized into appeals to fear (argumentum ad baculum); appeals to pity (argumentum ad misericordiam); and appeals to sympathy or to the people (argumentum ad populum).

Appeals to emotion arise when a person “instead of presenting evidence for a conclusion, attempts to win approval for it by playing upon the feelings of those to whom the argument is addressed.” And appeals to tradition are “argument[s] in which rituals or customs of the past are offered to justify claims about what should or should not be done in the present. Precedent is substituted for reason.”

With both appeals to emotion and appeals to tradition, then, deductive and inductive reasoning is discarded for appeals to the audience’s present feelings or society’s past rituals.

Rebutting appeals to emotion: The cases of international and social justice

In the law, appeals to emotion are ubiquitous. A common example is the little-guy-versus-big-corporation argument (appeals to pity or sympathy):

Mr. Jones doesn’t dispute that he didn’t pay his mortgage; but he couldn’t pay because he recently lost his job. In any event, the bank is so big that it won’t even notice if Mr. Jones gets a few more months to get current with his payments.

True, this might be the only argument Mr. Jones’s lawyer can make, and it doesn’t mean that the lawyer’s appeal to the court’s emotions and sympathies isn’t rhetorically persuasive. But if you’re representing the bank, the rejoinder is:

Despite Mr. Jones’s financial circumstances, he doesn’t dispute that he failed to pay his mortgage. That’s the only issue before this Court.

Mr. Jones and his late mortgage payments is a simplistic example of an appeal to emotion, and how you can easily rebut it. But other appeals to emotion (especially appeals to pity and sympathy) are more subtle because they get cloaked in nebulous, value-laden concepts.

WHAT’S INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE?

Consider the concept of “international justice.” In Editorial board muddles definition of justice, I noted that the Minnesota Daily had argued in an editorial that the United States should join the International Criminal Court because that deferential act would promote “international justice.”

I argued that by cloaking its value-laden argument in vague concepts of “international justice” and promoting a “just world,” the Daily was attempting to insulate its policy judgment—that the United States should join the International Criminal Court—in an “unassailable moral imperative,” not in logic or reason. In other words, the Daily was playing to its readers’ emotions—their desire for a “just world” in some abstract sense.

SOCIAL JUSTICE? TO WHOM AND FOR WHOM?

Cloaking arguments in social-justice concepts also is an appeal to the audience’s emotions because there’s no consensus about what the term “social justice” means, despite some lawyers’ attempts to unilaterally define its meaning.

For example, Austrian economist and political philosopher F.A. Hayek rejected the usefulness of the term “social justice” if a person uses it to justify government’s pre-determined redistributive policies. Hayek’s view, generally speaking, was that the results of market processes were morally neutral—neither socially unjust nor socially just. In contrast to Hayek, however, political philosopher John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, generally argued that government promotes “social justice” when it implements pre-determined redistributive policies—his so-called ”justice-as-fairness principle.”

In the narrower legal context, this Hayekian-Rawlsian debate usually manifests itself inarguments about whether the law should protect “negative rights,” that is, protect persons from government encroachment on their inalienable rights—like private property and free exercise of religion, or whether the law should foster “positive rights,” that is, promote the rights of people to receive tangible things like free health care or housing under the auspices of equal treatment under the law.

In any event, neither Hayek nor Rawls could argue their case for “social justice” in particular cases using deductive or inductive logic because the major premise of their arguments—the meaning of the term “social justice”—isn’t sufficiently accepted. Indeed, in his seminal The Mirage of Social Justice, Hayek acknowledged that his view of the meaning of “social justice” was “one which by its very nature cannot be proved. A negative assertion never can.”

So if you see your opposing counsel supporting an argument with an appeal to “social justice,” a simple rebuttal would be:

Mr. Brown argues the Court should rule in his favor because that would be the socially just result. But he doesn’t claim there’s agreement among the courts or even society in general about what would be the socially just result here. That’s because there is no agreement. The Court should decide the case based on established law, and the law says Mr. Brown’s claims have no merit.

Rebutting appeals to tradition: The case of same-sex marriage

No less troublesome than appeals to emotion are appeals to tradition. Churchill gives an example of an appeal to tradition that’s particularly relevant to the emotion-riling contemporary debate over whether states should recognize same-sex marriage:

The institution of marriage has lasted as long as men and women have sought to honor their God. Indeed it is as old as the history of civilization itself. Thus marriage must be considered sacred.

Though rhetorically sound, this reasoning also is logically fallacious because, without additional reasons for maintaining the sanctity of marriage, the argument for recognizing only opposite-sex marriages is supported only by tradition.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized this appeal to tradition in its May 21, 2012 decision striking down the Defense of Marriage Act:

Traditions are the glue that holds society together, and many of our own traditions rest largely on belief and familiarity—not on benefits firmly provable in court. The desire to retain them is strong and can be honestly held.

For 150 years, this desire to maintain tradition would alone have been justification enough for almost any statute. . . . But Supreme Court decisions in the last fifty years call for closer scrutiny of government action touching upon minority group interests and of federal action in areas of traditional state concern.

Be ready to pounce on ethos and pathos

Because lawyers are committed to equal treatment under the law, they generally strive to cabin their legal arguments in logos—deductive and inductive reasoning, grounded in generally accepted premises. Lawyers’ commitment to this bedrock of logic ensures that the U.S. legal system remains one of ”laws and not of men.” Lawyers leave the politicians to peddle in appeals to emotions, feelings, sympathies, and traditions.

So if an opponent argues that the “little guy” (or “good corporate citizen”) should win merely because of their unique circumstances; or that a particular decision will promote”social justice”; or that the judge should decide the case in a particular way because “that’s the way things always have been done,” you now have the knowledge and tools to rebut these fallacies of irrelevance. And somewhere, Aristotle will smile.

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